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Abstract
The discovery of heavy hitters (most frequent items) in user-generated data streams drives improve-
ments in the app and web ecosystems, but can incur substantial privacy risks if not done with care. To
address these risks, we propose a distributed and privacy-preserving algorithm for discovering the heavy
hitters in a population of user-generated data streams. We leverage the sampling property of our dis-
tributed algorithm to prove that it is inherently differentially private, without requiring additional noise.
We also examine the trade-off between privacy and utility, and show that our algorithm provides excellent
utility while also achieving strong privacy guarantees. A significant advantage of this approach is that
it eliminates the need to centralize raw data while also avoiding the significant loss in utility incurred
by local differential privacy. We validate our findings both theoretically, using worst-case analyses, and
practically, using a Twitter dataset with 1.6M tweets and over 650k users. Finally, we carefully compare
our approach to Apple’s local differential privacy method for discovering heavy hitters.
1 Introduction
Discovering the heavy hitters in a population of user-generated data streams plays an instrumental role in
improving mobile and web applications. For example, learning popular out-of-dictionary words can improve
the auto-complete feature in a smart keyboard, and discovering frequently-taken actions can provide an
improved in-app user experience. Naively, a service provider can learn the popular elements by first collecting
user data and then applying state-of-the-art centralized heavy hitters discovery algorithms [16, 15, 12].
However, collecting and analyzing data from users can introduce privacy risks.
To overcome some of these risks, the service provider can use the central model of differential privacy (DP)
to provide internal or external analysts with a privacy-preserving set of learned heavy hitters [24, 23, 21, 25,
6, 22]. However, this approach requires that users trust the service provider with their raw data. And even
with a fully trusted service provider, tighter privacy regulations, such as Europe’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), the risk of hacks and other data breaches, and subpoena powers may encourage service
providers to collect less data from their users.
The local model of DP [41, 27, 33] addresses the above concerns by requiring users to perturb their data
locally before sharing it with a service provider. Google [26], Apple [2], and others [19, 34] have deployed local
DP algorithms. However, a large body of fundamental work shows that in the context of learning distributions
and heavy hitters, local DP often leads to a significant reduction in utility [31, 40, 5, 32, 43, 20, 17]. As we
show (e.g., Table 2), there are regimes where local DP is infeasible for practical use. Our goal is to provide
practical algorithms that provide more privacy than prior approaches in such regimes, while maintaining
sufficient utility (precision and recall).1
Our work builds on recent advances in federated learning (FL) [38, 35, 37] to bridge the utility gap between
the local and central models of DP. Our proposed algorithm retains the essential privacy ingredients of FL:
(a) no raw data collection (only ephemeral, focused updates from a random subset of users are sent back to
the service provider), (b) decentralization across a large population of users (most users will contribute only
∗Work done while interning at Google.
1Whether or not a given approach provides sufficient privacy for a particular application is largely a domain-dependent
policy question beyond the scope of this work; our goal is to expand the set of approaches available.
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0 or 1 times), (c) interactivity in building an aggregate understanding of the population. However, unlike
existing FL algorithms where the goal is to learn a prediction model, our work introduces a new federated
approach that allows a service provider to discover the heavy hitters.
Contributions We develop an interactive heavy hitters discovery algorithm that achieves central DP
while minimizing the data collected from users. In contrast to classical distribution estimation problems,
our goal is to discover the heavy hitters but not their frequencies2. For example, in a smart mobile keyboard
application, our algorithm allows a service provider to discover out-of-dictionary words and add them to
the keyboard’s dictionary, allowing these words to be automatically spell-corrected and typed using gesture
typing.
We assume, without loss of generality,3 that items (e.g., words) in user-generated data streams have
a sequential structure (e.g., sequence of characters). Thus, we refer to items as sequences and leverage
their sequential structure to build our algorithm. Our algorithm runs in multiple rounds. In each round, a
randomly selected set of users transmit a “vote” for a one element extension to popular prefixes discovered
in previous rounds. The server then aggregates the received votes using a trie structure, prunes nodes that
have counts that fall below a chosen threshold θ, and continues to the next round.
We prove that our algorithm is inherently differentially private, and show how the parameters of the
algorithm can be chosen to obtain precise privacy guarantees (see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). When
the number of users n ≥ 104 and the sequences have a length of at most 10, our algorithm guarantees
(2, 1n2 )-differential privacy. See Table 1 for the DP parameters we can provide for various population sizes.
A key property of our algorithm is that it is sufficient for the service provider to receive only the set of
extensions to the trie with votes that exceed a threshold θ, and the set of possible extensions is finite and
known at the start of each round. A simple implementation of our algorithm would have the service provider
directly receive each selected user’s anonymous vote, and then immediately aggregate and threshold these
votes in memory, with no persistence of the unaggregated votes.
However, our algorithm was explicitly designed to allow it to be implemented using aggregation schemes
that further limit the information the service provider receives. In particular, a cryptographic secure sum
protocol such as that of [8] can be used to count votes, so the service provider never sees individual votes,
only the aggregate sum over all users in the round (and only if a sufficient number of users participate). The
service provider then is only trusted to apply the threshold θ. An intriguing open question is whether an
efficient secure multi-party computation can be developed which also performs the thresholding. Another
approach is to use the ESA architecture of [7] to ensure shuffling and anonymization of the votes.
We have already discussed the privacy advantages of our approach compared to centralized approaches
with DP that collect and store raw user data; undoubtedly such approaches could offer even higher utility,
but we do not empirically assess this, as it is enough to show our algorithm achieves sufficient utility to be
practical in many settings. Rather, we focus our empirical evaluation of utility on a comparison to local DP
(in particular [2]), demonstrating that our algorithm obtains a strong central DP guarantee and high utility
in settings where local DP performs poorly (see Table 2 for details). We use the Sentiment140 dataset, a
Twitter dataset with 1.6M tweets and over 650k users [30]. For Sentiment140, the top 200 words are recalled
at a rate close to 1 with ε = 4 and δ < 5× 10−9.
Related work Federated learning (FL) [37, 35, 9] is a collaborative learning approach that enables a
service provider to learn a prediction model without collecting user data (i.e., while keeping the training
data on user devices). The training phase of FL is interactive and executes in multiple rounds. In each
round, a randomly chosen small set of online users download the latest model and improve it locally using
their training data. Only the updates are then sent back to the service provider where they are aggregated
and used to update the global model. Much of the existing works are in the context of learning prediction
models. Our work differs in that it focuses on federated algorithms for the discovery of heavy hitters.
Differential privacy (DP) is a rigorous privacy notion that has been carefully studied over the last decade
[24, 23, 21, 22] and widely adopted in industry [19, 2, 34, 26], provides the ability to make such strong formal
privacy guarantees. There is a rich body of work on distribution learning, frequent sequence mining, and
2Observe that once the popular items are discovered, learning their frequencies can be done using off-the-shelf DP techniques.
3Regardless of the items’ data type, they can always be represented by a sequence of bits.
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heavy-hitter discovery both in the central and local models of DP [6, 10, 18, 42, 44, 32, 40, 5, 1, 43, 3, 11, 17],
and some recent works combine FL with central DP [29, 39]. The central model of DP assumes that users
trust the service provider with their raw data while the local one gets away with this assumption. Thus, the
utility loss is not as severe in the central model where the service provider may have access to the entire
dataset. Our work bridges these existing models of privacy in that it allows an honest-but-curious service
provider to learn the popular sequences in a centrally differentially private way, while only having access to
minimal data: a randomly chosen user submits one character extension to an already discovered popular
prefix.
Methods that provide DP typically involve adding noise, such as Gaussian noise, to the data before
releasing it. In this work, we show that DP can be obtained without the addition of any noise by relying
exclusively on random sampling and trie pruning which achieves k-anonymity. The connection between
DP, random sampling, and k-anonymity has previously appeared in the literature [13, 36, 28]. However,
these methods show how sampling and enforcing k-anonymity at the sequence level can achieve central DP.
Therefore, such approaches have the disadvantage of revealing the entire sequences held by sampled users.
On the contrary, our method explores how interactivity, random sampling, and k-anonymity can achieve
central DP while also drastically minimizing the data a user shares with the service provider.
Our algorithm exploits the hierarchical structure of user-generated data streams to interactively maintain
a trie structure that contains the frequent sequences. The idea of using trie-like structures for finding frequent
sequences in data streams has been explored before in [16, 5]. However, the work of Cormode et al. [16]
predates differential privacy and the TreeHist algorithm of Bassily et al. [5] achieves local DP.
2 Preliminaries
Model and notation We consider a population of n users D = {u1, u2, . . . , un}, where user i has a
collection of items {wi1, wi2, · · · , wiq}. We abuse notation and use D to refer to both the set of all users and
set of all items. As discussed in the introduction, we assume (without loss of generality) that the items have
a sequential structure and refer to them as sequences. More precisely, we express an item w as a sequence
w = c1c2 . . . c|w| of |w| elements. For example, in our experiments (see Section 5), we focus on discovering
heavy-hitter words in a population of tweets generated by Twitter users. Therefore, each user has a collection
of words, and each word can be expressed as a sequence of ASCII characters. We assume that the length of
any sequence is at most L.
For any set D, we build a trie via a randomized algorithmM to obtain an estimate of the heavy hitters.
We let pi(w) denote the prefix of w of length i. For a trie T and a prefix q = c1, c2 . . . ci, we say that q ∈ T
if there exists a path (root, c1, c2, . . . , ci) in T . Also, let Ti denote the subtree of T that contains all nodes
and edges from the first i levels of T . Suppose (root, c1, c2, . . . , ci) is a path of length i in Ti. Growing the
trie from Ti to Ti+1 by “adding prefix (root, c1, c2, . . . , ci, ci+1) to Ti” means appending a child node ci+1 to
ci.
Differential privacy A randomized algorithmM is (ε, δ)-differentially private iff for all S ⊆ Range(M),
and for all adjacent datasets D and D′:
P (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eεP (M(D′) ∈ S) + δ. (1)
We adopt user-level adjacency where D and D′ are adjacent if D′ can be obtained by adding all the items
associated with a single user from D [39]. This is stronger than the typically used notion of adjacency where
D and D′ differ by only one item [22].
Paper organization We focus in Section 3 on the setting where each user has a single sequence (q = 1).
We present the basic version of our algorithm, prove that it is differentially private, and provide worst-case
utility guarantees. Combining key insights from Section 3, we handle the more general case of multiple
sequences per user in Section 4. We present, in Section 5, extensive simulation results on the Sentiment140
Twitter dataset of 1.6M tweets [30]. We conclude our paper with a few interesting and non-trivial extensions
in Section 6. All proofs and additional experiments are deferred to the supplementary material.
3
3 Single Sequence per User
In this section, we consider a simple setting where each user has single sequence. Much of the intuition
behind the algorithm and privacy guarantees we present in this section carry over to the more realistic
setting of multiple sequences per user.
Figure 1 shows an example of how our algorithm works in the context of learning heavy-hitter English
words. Suppose we have n = 20 users and each user has a single word. Assume there are three popular
words: “star” (on 3 devices), “sun” (on 4 devices) and “moon”(on 4 devices). The rest of the words appear
once each. We add a “$” to the end of each word as an “end of sequence” (EOS) symbol. In each round, the
service provider selects m = 10 random users, asks them to vote for a prefix of their word (as long as it is an
extension of the prefixes learned in previous rounds), and stores the prefixes that receive votes greater than
or equal to θ = 2 in a trie. In the example in the figure, two prefixes “s” and “m” of length 1 grow on the
trie after the first round. This means that among the 10 randomly selected users, at least two of them voted
for “s” and at least another two voted for “m”. Observe that users who have “sun” and “star” share the
first character “s”, so “s” has a significant chance of being added to the trie. In the second round, 10 users
are randomly selected and provided with the depth 1 trie learned so far (containing “s” and ”m”). In this
round, a selected user votes for the length 2 prefix of their word only if it starts with an “s” or “m”. The
service provider then aggregates the received votes and adds a prefix to the trie if it receives at least θ = 2
votes. In this particular example, prefixes “st”, “su”, and “mo” are learned after the second round. This
process is repeated for prefixes of length 3 and 4 in the third and the fourth rounds, respectively. After the
fourth round, the word “sun$” is completely learned, but the prefix “sta” stopped growing. This is because
at least two of the three users holding “star” were selected in the second and third round, but less than two
were chosen in the fourth one. The word “moon$” is completely learned in the fifth round. Finally, the
algorithm terminates in the sixth round, and the completely learned words are “sun$” and “moon$”.
Figure 1: Example run of Algorithm 1.
Input: A set D = {u1, u2, . . . , un} that have
words {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. A threshold θ. Batch
size m = γ
√
n.
Output: A trie T .
Set T = {root}; Told = None; i = 1;
while T ! = Told do
Choose m users from D randomly to get a set
X˜ of sequences;
Told = T ;
T = V(X˜ , T, θ, i); i++;
end while
return T ;
Algorithm 1: Trie-based Heavy Hitters M(D, θ, γ)
Algorithm 2 Algorithm V(X˜ , Tin, θ, i) to grow a trie by one level with a set of sequences.
Input: A set of sequences X˜ = {w′1, w′2, . . . , w′m}. An input trie Tin with i levels. A threshold θ.
Output: An output trie.
Initialize Candidates[w′j ] = 0 for all w
′
j ∈ X˜ ;
for each sequence w′j in X˜ that |w′j | ≥ i and pi−1(w′j) ∈ Tin do
Candidates[pi(w
′
j)]++;
end for
return Tin + {p | Candidates[p] ≥ θ};
To describe the algorithm formally, for a set of users D, our algorithmM(D, θ, γ) runs in multiple rounds,
and returns a trie that contains the popular sequences in D. In each round of the algorithm, a batch of
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size m = γ
√
n (with γ ≥ 1) users are selected uniformly at random from D. Note that m could be chosen
differently, and there are interesting trade-offs between the utility and privacy as a function of m. We will
discuss these trade-offs later in this section.
In ith round, randomly selected users receive a trie containing the popular prefixes that have been learned
so far. If a user’s sequence has a length i− 1 prefix that is in the trie, they declare the length i prefix of the
sequence they have. Otherwise, they do nothing. Prefixes that are declared by at least θ ≈ log n selected
users grow on the ith level of the trie. Note that we grow at most one level of the trie in each round of the
algorithm. Thus, if c1, . . . , ci−1 /∈ Ti−1, then c1, . . . , ci−1, ci cannot be in Ti. The final output of M is the
trie returned by the algorithm when it stops growing. Algorithm 1 describes our distributed algorithm and
Algorithm 2 shows a single round of the algorithm to grow one level of the trie.
Given the final trie, we extract the heavy-hitter sequences learned by Algorithm 1 by simply outputting
the discovered prefixes from the root to leaves that end with $ (the EOS symbol). Note that the non-EOS
leaves also represent frequent prefixes in the population, which might still be valuable depending on the
application.
Privacy guarantees Algorithm 1 has several privacy advantages: (a) randomly chosen users vote on a
single character extension to an already discovered popular prefix, (b) the votes are ephemeral (i.e., never
stored), and (c) a total of Lγ
√
n randomly chosen users participate in the algorithm. More importantly,
sequences discovered by Algorithm 1 are k-anonymous with k = θ, and as shown in the theorem below, the
output of Algorithm 1 is inherently (ε, δ)-differentially private – without the need for additional randomiza-
tion or noise addition.
Theorem 1. When 4 ≤ θ ≤ √n and 1 ≤ γ ≤
√
n
θ+1 , Algorithm 1 is (L ln(1 +
1√
n
γθ −1
), θ−2(θ−3)θ! )-differentially
private.
We give a proof sketch here. See Supplementary Section A for the full proof.
Proof Sketch. Suppose D is obtained by adding w to a neighboring D′ and assume |w| = l. We first
decompose any S ⊆ Range(M) into S0 ∪ S1 ∪ . . .Sl, where S0 = {T ∈ S|pi(w) /∈ T, for i = 1, 2, . . . , l}
and Si = {T ∈ S|p1(w), . . . , pi(w) ∈ T and pi+1, . . . , pl /∈ T} for i = 1, 2, . . . , l. Assume there are k users
in D′ that have prefix pi(w). Then we show that when k is large, the ratio between P (M(D) ∈ Si) and
P (M(D′) ∈ Si) is small so it could be bounded by eε. When k is small, P (M(D) ∈ Si) is small enough so
it could be bounded by δ. Intuitively, when k is large, it means prefix pi(w) is already popular in D′, so the
fact that D has one more user with this prefix does not affect the probability of it showing in the result too
much. When k is small, the chance of prefix pi(w) showing up in the result is very small, even with an extra
user with it in D.
The above result holds for a wide array of algorithm parameters (L, γ, and θ). The following corollary
shows how precise privacy guarantees can be obtained by tuning the algorithm’s parameters.
Corollary 1. To achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy, set γ = (e
ε
L −1)√n/(θe εL ) and θ = max{10, deW (C)+1−
1
2e}, where W is the Lambert W function [14] and C = (ln 87√2piδ )/e. Further, when n ≥ 104, choosing
θ = dlog10 n+ 6e ensures that Algorithm 1 is (ε, 1300n )-differentially private 4.
Proof. See Supplementary Section B.
Table 1 shows how we can choose γ and θ to achieve (ε, 1/(300n)) and (ε, 1/n2) for various values of n.
Since under Algorithm 1 the privacy loss can be large with probability δ (unlike mechanisms that rely on
explicit noise addition), we focus (almost exclusively) on δ < 1/n2 in Section 5 where we conduct experiments
on real data and compare to local differential privacy.
4In general, to get a δ ≤ 1
na
, by standard approximation of the Lambert function, we can choose θ ≈ a lnn
ln lnn
.
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Figure 2: Minimum n required to ensure (via Propo-
sition 1) a worst-case discovery rate greater than 0.9
for L = 10 and δ = 1/n2.
Table 1: Choices of θ and γ to achieve ε = 2 in
two cases: δ ≤ 1300n and δ ≤ 1n2 .
n
L = 10
δ ≤ 1300n δ ≤ 1n2
θ γ θ γ
104 10 1.81 12 1.51
105 11 5.21 14 4.09
106 12 15.10 15 12.08
107 13 44.09 17 33.71
Utility guarantees By the sampling nature of Algorithm 1, sequences that appear more frequently are
more likely to be learned. The batch size m and threshold θ could be tuned to trade off utility for privacy.
For a user set of size n, smaller m and larger θ achieve better privacy at the expense of lower utility, and
vice versa.
To quantify utility under Algorithm 1, we examine the worst-case discovery rate of a sequence (probability
of discovering it) as a function of its frequency in the dataset. In particular, we consider the worst-case
discovery rate which captures the probability of discovering a sequence assuming that it shares no prefixes
with other sequences in the dataset. In the presence of such common prefixes, the discovery rate will only
get better (see Section 5 for a comparison between worst-case discovery rates and ones that are achievable
on real data).
Proposition 1. Suppose a sequence appears W times in a dataset of n users where the longest sequence has
length L. Then the worst-case discovery rate under Algorithm 1 is given by 1(
n
m
) min{W,m}∑
i=θ
(
W
i
)(
n−W
m− i
)L . (2)
Proof. This proposition is derived directly from Proposition 2 in Supplementary Section A.
Using Corollary 1 and Proposition 1, we can investigate how large the population should be if we want
to discover sequences with high probability for a fixed ε. Figure 2 shows the relationship between sequence
frequency and population size n if we want the worst-case discovery rate to be at least 0.9 for different
ε’s. Naturally, in order to be discovered with high probability, lower frequency sequences require larger
population size, and vice versa. We also need larger populations for stronger privacy guarantees (smaller ε).
4 Multiple Sequences per User
In this section, we consider the more general setting where each user could have more than one sequence on
their device. Suppose the population is a set of n users D = {u1, u2, . . . , un}, and each user ui has a set of
sequences {wi1, wi2, . . . , wiq}.
Let ci(wj) denote the number of appearances of wj on ui’s device. We define the local frequency of wj on
ui’s device as fi(wj) = ci(wj)/
∑
j ci(wj). Note that the sum of all the sequences’ local frequencies on ui’s
device is 1, i.e.
∑
j fi(wj) = 1. If a sequence wj has 0 appearance on ui’s device, then fi(wj) = 0. Similarly,
6
for a certain prefix pj , let ci(pj) denote the number of appearances of pj on ui’s device. Then the frequency
of pj on ui’s device is fi(pj) = ci(pj)/
∑
j ci(pj).
We are now ready to generalize Algorithm 1 to accommodate multiple sequences per user. In each round
of the algorithm, we select a batch of m users from D uniformly at random. A chosen user ui randomly selects
a sequence wj ∈ ui with probability fi(wj), i.e., according to its local frequency. Thus, as in Algorithm 1,
we still select m sequences from m users in every round. The voting step by these m sequences proceeded in
the same way described in Algorithm 2. Algorithm 3 (in Section C.1 of attached supplementary materials)
shows the full algorithm.
Interestingly, the differential privacy guarantees we obtained in the single sequence setting also hold in the
multiple sequence setting under Algorithm 3. This is formally stated in Corollary 2. To get this conclusion,
we first provide the following more general (but intuitive) result.
Theorem 2. Assume mechanism M achieves (ε, δ) record-level5 DP on a dataset of size n. Consider a
setting where we have n users and an arbitrary number of records per user. Then the mechanism that first
selects 1 record per user (deterministically or randomly) then applies M to the sampled dataset of size n
achieves (ε, δ) user-level DP.
Proof. See Supplementary Section A.
Corollary 2. When 4 ≤ θ ≤ √n and γ ≤
√
n
θ+1 , Algorithm 3 is (L ln(1 +
1√
n
γθ −1
), θ−2(θ−3)θ! )-differentially
private.
Proof. This corollary follows directly from Theorem 2.
5 Experiments
In this section, we showcase the performance of our trie-based heavy hitters (TrieHH) algorithm on real data
and compare it to Apple’s Sequence Fragment Puzzle (SFP) algorithm, a state-of-the-art sketching based
algorithm for discovering heavy hitters with local DP [2]. For a more fair comparison, we “amplify” a local
εlocal used by SFP to a central (ε, δ = 1/n
2) used in TrieHH according to [4]. We also focus exclusively on
the discovery stage of SFP and do not account for the count estimation stage. Since the tradeoff between
precision and recall could be tuned by a parameter T 6 under SFP, we compare Trie HH and SFP using
precision, recall, and F1 score. We use Sentiment140, a rich Twitter dataset [30], and conduct three sets of
experiments (see below for details). We run our experiments many times and report averaged utility metrics
with 0.95 confidence intervals. The top 100 words and their frequencies are shown in Section C.3 of the
supplementary material.
Single word per user: heavy hitters case To simulate this setting using Sentiment140, we create a
dataset by choosing the word with highest local frequency for each user and apply Algorithm 1 (referred to
as TrieHH) on this dataset. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the word frequencies and the discovery
rate using TrieHH. We limit L to 10, set δ = 1/n2, then choose θ and γ according to Corollary 1 to achieve
various values of ε. The dashed lines represent the theoretical worst-case bounds on the discovery probability
(presented in Section 3). Observe that there is a gap between the experimental results and the theoretical
worst-case ones. This is because the theoretical bounds assume that sequences share no prefixes with others
in the dataset, while in Sentiment140, many English words do share some prefixes. We also study the F1
score of the K highest frequency words in the population. Figure 4 shows the F1 score of the top K words
vs. K with comparison to SFP. For SFP, ε = 1→ εlocal = 4.29 and ε = 4→ εlocal = 4.96.
Single word per user: out-of-vocab (OOV) case To simulate this setting using Sentiment140, OOV
words are obtained by first scanning through the dataset and keeping only words that are made up of English
letters and a few other symbols (such as ”@” and ”#”) and then ensuring that these words do not belong
5The difference between record-level and user-level DP is in the way neighboring datasets are defined. Under record-level
DP, only a single record is varied when comparing D to D′.
6The parameters are proxies and don’t necessarily represent actual performance of Apple’s system.
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to a highly tuned dictionary of over 260k words. After this pre-processing step, the frequencies of the OOV
words are calculated and a dataset of size 6M is sampled according to those frequencies. Figure 5 shows the
F1 score of the top K words for both TrieHH and SFP. Observe that the curves for both TrieHH and SFP
are not monotonically decreasing for small K. This is because there are many long words in the top 10 to 20
of the OOV Twitter dataset (corresponding to usernames of trending Twitter users), and both algorithms
perform worse for longer words. For larger K, the lengths of top words get smaller and more consistent.
Table 2 shows recall at K = 50 and precision for both algorithms with different choices T for SFP. For SFP,
ε = 1 → εlocal = 5.31 and ε = 4 → εlocal = 5.99 due to amplification. By increasing T for SFP, there is a
gain of recall but the precision also drops dramatically. Some examples of interesting OOV words we have
discovered include: ”*hugs*”, ”*sigh*”, ”:’(”, ”@tommcfly”, ”@dddlovato”, ”#ff”, ”#fb”, ”b/c”, ”ya’ll”.
Multiple words per user: heavy hitters case We use Sentiment140 as is for this experiment and
calculate the population frequency of wj by F (wj) =
1
n
∑
i fi(wj). Similar to the single word setting, Figure
6 shows the relationship between the word frequency and the discovery rate using Algorithm 3. Note that in
the multiple words setting, it is difficult to get a non-trivial lower bound on the discovery rate of Algorithm
3 because such bound heavily depends on the distribution of words. Figure 6 shows the discovery rate and
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Table 2: Comparison of recall at K = 50 and preci-
sion between TrieHH and SFP in the OOV setting.
Set δ = 1n2 . Choose T = 20, 80 for SFP.
ε = 1 ε = 4
Recall Prec Recall Prec
TrieHH 0.65 1 0.76 1
SFP (20) 0.16 0.875 0.196 0.96
SFP (80) 0.21 0.43 0.245 0.37
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Figure 7 shows the recall of the top K words. Observe that the top 200 words are recalled at a rate close to
1 with ε = 4 and δ < 5× 10−9
6 Conclusion and Open Questions
We have introduced a novel federated algorithm for learning the frequent sequences in a population of user-
generated data streams. We proved that it is inherently differentially private, investigated the trade-off
between privacy and utility, and showed that it can provide excellent utility while achieving strong privacy
guarantees. A significant advantage of this approach is that it eliminates the need to centralize raw data
while also avoiding the harsh utility penalty of differential privacy in the local model. Indeed, any individual
user only votes for a single-character extension to an existing trie. Many questions remain to be addressed,
including (a) examining whether or not interactivity is necessary, and (b) exploring secure multi-party
computation and cryptographic primitives such as shuffling, threshold oblivious pseudorandom functions,
and fully homomorphic encryption to provide stronger privacy guarantees.
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Supplementary Material
A Proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
We will show that when n ≥ 104, choosing θ ≥ 10, γ ≥ 1, and γ ≤
√
n
θ+1 , ensures that Algorithm 1 is(
L ln
(
1 + 1√n
γθ −1
)
, θ−2(θ−3)θ!
)
-differentially private. This theorem is proved by combining two lemmas that
deal with different cases of the population. In Lemma 1, we first show a bound on the ratio between
P (Mi(D, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) and P (Mi(D′, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) for any trie T ∈ Range(M) that pi(w) ∈ Ti
. This bound depends on k, the number of sequences that have prefix pi(w) in D′. It is obvious that
when k = θ − 1, P (Mi(D′, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) must be 0, but the number of sequences having prefix pi(w)
in D is θ, so P (Mi(D, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) is greater than 0. In this case, the ratio between them approaches
infinity. On the one hand, if the number of sequences with prefix pi(w) in D′ is already large, then an
extra pi(w) in D only affects the probability slightly, so the ratio between P (Mi(D, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) and
P (Mi(D′, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) is small, and it could be bounded by a small ε. On the other hand, if the number
of sequences with pi(w) in D is actually small, then the probability P (Mi(D, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) is small, and
could be bounded by a reasonably small δ. This case is handled by Lemma 2.
We start by calculating the probability that a prefix p appears at least θ times if we randomly choose m
users from a pool of users of size n, assuming that p appears W times in the population.
Proposition 2. Suppose prefix p appears W times in a pool of n users. If we select m users uniformly at
random from them, then the probability that prefix p is appears at least θ times is
1(
n
m
) min{W,m}∑
i=θ
(
W
i
)(
n−W
m− i
)
Proof. The probability that a prefix p appears i times follows the hypergeometric distribution P (i) =
1
(nm)
(
W
i
)(
n−W
m−i
)
. To calculate the probability that p appears at least θ times in the chosen subset, we sum up
the case that p appears θ, θ + 1, . . . ,min{W,m} times.
The above probability expression will be useful in the proof of Lemma 2 below, and when we investigate
the privacy-utility trade-off in Section 3. Also, Proposition 1 is derived from Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. ∀T ∈ Range(M) such that pi(w) ∈ Ti, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, assume there are k users in D′ that have
prefix pi(w), and k ≥ θ. Then P (Mi(D, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) ≤ (1 + θk−θ+1 )P (Mi(D′, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti).
Proof. Let C(D, µ, θ, γ, Tin, Tout) be a function to count the number of ways to choose µ users (denote the
set of chosen users as X˜ ) from a set of users D, that using Algorithm 2, V(X˜ , Tin, θ, i) = Tout. Also, we
denote C(D, µ, θ, γ, Tin, Tout|pi(w)) as the number of ways to choose users under the same condition, given
prefix pi(w) is added to Tout in this step.
Remember D and D′ differ in only one sequence w and w′, that |w| = l, |w′| = 0. We denote w’s prefix
of length i as pi(w). For any output trie T ∈ Range(M), consider the step to grow Ti from Ti−1 by Mi. Let
Z = D − {w} = D′ − {w′}. We assume there are k users in D′ that have prefix pi(w) of w. We denote this
subset of users in D′ as W. Thus the set of users in D that have prefix pi(w) is W + {w} with size k + 1.
We abuse the notation to use C(D, µ) instead of C(D, µ, θ, γ, Tin, Tout), and C(D, µ|pi(w)) instead of
C(D, µ, θ, γ, Tin, Tout|pi(w)) for fixed θ, γ, Tin, Tout.
We calculate P (Mi(D, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) by the ratio between C(D,m, θ, γ, Ti−1, Ti) (how many ways to
choose m users from D, that V(D, Tin, θ, i) returns Tout and
(
n
m
)
(how many ways to choose m users from
D).
Also, we could separate C(D′,m, θ, γ, Ti−1, Ti) into two parts: not choosing w′ (taking all m users from
D′ − {w′}), or choosing w′ (taking the rest m− 1 users from D′ − {w′}). Thus,
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P (Mi(D′, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) = C(D
′,m, θ, γ, Ti−1, Ti)(
n
m
)
=
1(
n
m
) (C(D′ − {w′},m) + C(D′ − {w′},m− 1))
=
1(
n
m
) (C(Z,m) + C(Z,m− 1)) (3)
Consider C(Z,m − 1, θ, γ, Ti−1, Ti), because pi(w) ∈ Ti, so there must be at least θ users in the chosen
set voting for pi(w). We consider the following cases separately: choosing θ users from W, m− 1− θ users
from Z −W (note that pi(w) ∈ Ti is already guaranteed by choosing θ users from W, so we consider pi(w)
as a given condition here), and choosing θ + 1 users from W, m− θ − 1 users from Z −W, . . . , i.e.,
C(Z,m− 1) =
min{k,m}∑
i=θ
(
k
i
)
C(Z −W,m− i− 1|pi(w))
Similarly for C(Z,m), not choosing w (taking all m users from D − {w}) or choosing w (taking the rest
m− 1 users from D′ − {w}).
C(Z,m) =
(
k
θ
)
C(Z −W,m− θ|pi(w))
+
min{k,m}∑
i=θ+1
(
k
i
)
C(Z −W,m− i|pi(w))
Thus,
C(Z −W,m− θ|pi(w)) ≤ 1(k
θ
)C(Z,m) (4)
C(D,m, θ, γ, Ti−1, Ti) could also be considered as not choosing w (taking all m users from D − {w}) or
choosing w (taking the rest m − 1 users from D − {w}). But different from D′, if w ∈ D is chosen, we can
choose θ − 1 to k users contain prefix pi(w) from Z −W. Thus,
C(D,m, θ, γ, Ti−1, Ti)
= C(Z,m) +
(
k
θ − 1
)
C(Z −W,m− θ|pi(w))
+
min{k,m}∑
i=θ
(
k
i
)
C(Z −W,m− i− 1|pi(w))
= C(Z,m) +
(
k
θ − 1
)
C(Z −W,m− θ|pi(w))
+ C(Z,m− 1) (5)
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By Equation 5 and Inequality 4,
P (Mi(D, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti) = C(D,m, θ, γ, Ti−1, Ti)(n
m
)
=
1(
n
m
) (C(Z,m) + ( k
θ − 1
)
C(Z −W,m− θ|pi(w))
+ C(Z,m− 1))
≤ 1(n
m
) (C(Z,m) + C(Z,m− 1) + ( kθ−1)(
k
θ
) C(Z,m))
=
1(
n
m
) (C(Z,m) + C(Z,m− 1)
+
θ
k − θ + 1C(Z,m))
≤ (1 + θ
k − θ + 1)
1(
n
m
) (C(Z,m) + C(Z,m− 1))
= (1 +
θ
k − θ + 1)P (Mi(D
′, θ, γ, Ti−1) = Ti)
Suppose there are k users has prefix p1(w). In Lemma 2, we show that when k ≤
√
n
γ − 1, P (p1(w) ∈
M1(D, θ, γ)) ≤ θ−2(θ−3)θ! . This means when k is small, the probability that p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ) is small, so it
could be bounded by a small δ. And it is the same for the ith round that when there are k users has prefix
pi(w). If k ≤
√
n
γ − 1, then P (pi−1(w) ∈M(D, θ, γ)|pi−2(w) ∈M(D, θ, γ)) ≤ θ−2(θ−3)θ! .
Lemma 2. Consider the step to grow Ti from Ti−1 by Mi. We assume there are k users in D′ that have
prefix pi(w) of w. Then there are k + 1 users in D that have prefix pi(w). When k ≤
√
n
γ − 1, 4 ≤ θ ≤
√
n,
γ ≥ 1, P (pi(w) ∈M(D, θ, γ)|pi−1(w) ∈M(D, θ, γ)) ≤ θ−2(θ−3)θ! . For the first step, P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ)) ≤
θ−2
(θ−3)θ! .
Proof. First P (p1(w) ∈M(D, θ, γ)) ≤ P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ, T0)). To calculate P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ, T0)),
we consider the cases of choosing θ to k + 1 users voting for pi(w) separately, By Proposition 2,
P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ, T0))
=
1(
n
m
) min{k+1,m}∑
i=θ
(
k + 1
i
)(
n− k − 1
m− i
)
Note that when k + 1 < θ, P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ, T0)) = 0, so we only consider the case that k + 1 ≥ θ.
The sum of the array above could be upper bounded by the sum of a geometric sequence. We know that
k ≤
√
n
γ − 1, m = γ
√
n. Consider the ratio between the first two items,
(
k+1
θ+1
)(
n−k−1
m−θ−1
)(
k+1
θ
)(
n−k−1
m−θ
) = (k − θ + 1)(m− θ)
(θ + 1)(n− k −m+ θ)
≤
(
√
n
γ − θ)(γ
√
n− θ)
(θ + 1)(n−
√
n
γ + 1− γ
√
n+ θ)
≤ n
(θ + 1)(n− (γ + 1γ )
√
n+ 1 + θ)
≤ 1
(θ + 1)(1− γ+
1
γ√
n
)
(6)
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We denote 1
(θ+1)(1− γ+
1
γ√
n
)
as r1. Because k ≤
√
n
γ − 1 and k + 1 ≥ θ, so γ ≤
√
n
k+1 ≤
√
n
θ . We know that
γ ≥ 1, then γ + 1γ ≤ γ + 1 ≤
√
n
θ + 1. And also θ ≤
√
n, so γ + 1γ ≤
√
n
θ + 1 ≤ 2
√
n
θ . Now we are able to
bound r1:
r1 =
1
(θ + 1)(1− γ+
1
γ√
n
)
≤ 1
(θ + 1)(1−
2
√
n
θ√
n
)
≤ 1
(θ + 1)(1− 2θ )
≤ 1
θ(1− 2θ )
=
1
θ − 2
Note that when θ ≥ 4, r1 < 1.
Now we’ll show that the ratio between adjacent items is decreasing. Consider the ratio between any two
adjacent items
(
k+1
θ+i+1
)(
n−k−1
m−θ−i−1
)
and
(
k+1
θ+i
)(
n−k−1
m−θ−i
)
,
(
k+1
θ+i+1
)(
n−k−1
m−θ−i−1
)(
k+1
θ+i
)(
n−k−1
m−θ−i
) = (k − θ − i+ 1)(m− θ − i)
(θ + i+ 1)(n− k −m+ θ + i)
≤ (k − θ + 1)(m− θ)
(θ + 1)(n− k −m+ θ)
=
(
k+1
θ+1
)(
n−k−1
m−θ−1
)(
k+1
θ
)(
n−k−1
m−θ
)
≤ r1
Thus,
P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ, T0))
=
1(
n
m
) k+1∑
i=θ
(
k + 1
i
)(
n− k − 1
m− i
)
≤ 1(n
m
) (k+1−θ∑
i=0
ri1)
(
k + 1
θ
)(
n− k − 1
m− θ
)
≤ 1(n
m
) 1
1− r1
(
k + 1
θ
)(
n− k − 1
m− θ
)
The last line follows because r1 < 1.
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When k ≤
√
n
γ − 1,
P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ, T0))
≤ 1(n
m
) 1
1− r1
(
k + 1
θ
)(
n− k − 1
m− θ
)
≤ 1
(1− r1)θ! ×
θ−1∏
i=0
(k + 1− i)×
θ−1∏
i=0
(m− i)× 1∏θ−1
i=0 (n− i)
≤ 1
(1− r1)θ! ×
θ−1∏
i=0
(
√
n
γ
− i)×
θ−1∏
i=0
(γ
√
n− i)× 1∏θ−1
i=0 (n− i)
≤ 1
(1− r1)θ! ×
θ−1∏
i=0
n− ( 1γ + γ)
√
ni+ i2
n− i
≤ 1
(1− r1)θ!
Thus,
P (p1(w) ∈M1(D, θ, γ, T0)) ≤ 1
(1− r1)θ! ≤
θ − 2
(θ − 3)θ!
We could get the same upper bound for P (pi−1(w) ∈ M(D, θ, γ)|pi−2(w) ∈ M(D, θ, γ)) when there are
k + 1 users containing prefix pi(w), because it is also a one step voting process to determine if pi(w) will
grow on the trie.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By definition, algorithm M has (ε, δ)-differential privacy means that, ∀S ⊆ Range(M),
P (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eεP (M(D′) ∈ S) + δ (7)
When we choose the same fixed θ and γ for a certain n, we abuse the notation to useM(D) andMi(D, T )
instead of M(D, θ, γ) and Mi(D, θ, γ, T ).
Suppose |w| = l. We decompose S into S = S0∪S1∪. . .Sl. S0 is the subset of S that contains no prefix of
w, S1 is the subset of S that contains only p1(w), Si is the subset of S that only p1(w) to pi(w) of w. Formally,
S0 = {T ∈ S|pi(w) /∈ T, for i = 1, 2, . . . , l} and Si = {T ∈ S|p1(w), . . . , pi(w) ∈ T and pi+1, . . . , pl /∈ T} for
i = 1, 2, . . . , l. Then Inequality 7 is equivalent to,
l∑
i=0
P (M(D) ∈ Si) ≤ eε
l∑
i=0
P (M(D′) ∈ Si) + δ
Because the tries in S0 do not have any node in the path of w = (root, c1, c2, . . . , cl),
P (M(D) ∈ S0) ≤ P (M(D′) ∈ S0)
We define Ri = {T ∈ R|pi(w) ∈ T}. Note that different from Si, Ri contains all possible tries that
contain pi(w) (including those contain pi+1, pi+2, . . . ). Thus, Rl ⊆ Rl−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ R2 ⊆ R1, therefore
P (M(D) ∈ R1) ≥ P (M(D) ∈ R2) ≥ · · · ≥ P (M(D) ∈ Rl). Let j be the smallest index that P (M(D) ∈
Rj) ≤ θ−2(θ−3)θ! , if such j exists. Then,
l∑
i=j
P (M(D) ∈ Si) ≤ P (M(D) ∈ Rj) ≤ θ − 2
(θ − 3)θ!
For indexes i < j, we know that P (M(D) ∈ Ri) > θ−2(θ−3)θ! . For any i < j:
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P (M(D) ∈ Ri) = P (pi(w) ∈M(D)) = P (p1(w) ∈M(D))×
i−1∏
j=1
P (pj+1 ∈M(D)|pj ∈M(D))
Because P (M(D) ∈ Ri) > θ−2(θ−3)θ! , it must be the case that every term on the right hand side of the
equation above is greater than θ−2(θ−3)θ! , i.e., P (p1(w) ∈M(D)) ≥ θ−2(θ−3)θ! , and P (pi−1(w) ∈M(D)|pi−2(w) ∈
M(D)) ≥ θ−2(θ−3)θ! , ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , j − 1}. By Lemma 2, ki >
√
n
γ − 2, because ki is integer, ki ≥
√
n
γ − 1 ≥ θ
(because γ ≤
√
n
θ+1 ). ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}.
For each T ∈ Si, i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1},
P (M(D′) = T ) =
i∏
b=1
P (Mb(D′, Tb−1) = Tb)
Because ki >
√
n
γ − 2 ≥ θ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}, by Lemma 1,
P (M(D) = T )
=
i∏
b=1
P (Mb(D, Tb−1) = Tb)
≤
i∏
b=1
(1 +
θ
kb − θ + 1)P (Mb(D
′, Tb−1) = Tb)
≤ (1 + θ√
n
γ − 1− θ + 1
)iP (M(D′) = T )
= (1 +
1
√
n
γθ − 1
)iP (M(D′) = T )
Sum up for all T ∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sj−1,
P (M(D) ∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sj−1)
≤ (1 + 1√
n
γθ − 1
)j−1P (M(D′) ∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sj−1)
P (M(D) ∈ S)
=
j−1∑
i=1
P (M(D) ∈ Si) +
l∑
i=j
P (M(D) ∈ Si)
≤ (1 + 1√
n
γθ − 1
)j−1
j−1∑
i=1
P (M(D′) ∈ Si) + θ − 2
(θ − 3)θ!
≤ (1 + 1√
n
γθ − 1
)l
l∑
i=1
P (M(D′) ∈ Si) + θ − 2
(θ − 3)θ!
= (1 +
1
√
n
γθ − 1
)lP (M(D′) ∈ S) + θ − 2
(θ − 3)θ!
= (1 +
1
√
n
γθ − 1
)LP (M(D′) ∈ S) + θ − 2
(θ − 3)θ!
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose D and D′ are user-level neighboring datasets. Without loss of generality, assume D =
{D1, D2, . . . , Dn} and D′ = {D′1, D2, . . . , Dn}. Let M˜ denote the process to first randomly selects 1 record
per user (deterministically or randomly) and then applies M on the sampled dataset of size n.
Because M satisfies (ε, δ) record level DP, we know that for any record level neighboring datasets d and
d′, and ∀S ⊆ Range(M),
P (M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eε × P (M(d′) ∈ S) + δ
For any record level neighboring datasets d and d′, without loss of generality, we will foucs on neighboring
datasets that differ in the first record: d = d1d2 . . . dn and d
′ = d′1d2 . . . dn.
Our goal is to prove that ∀S ⊆ Range(M˜), P (M˜(D) ∈ S) ≤ eε × P (M˜(D′) ∈ S) + δ. Denote P (d|D) as
the probability of sampling d from D, then we can write P (M˜(D) ∈ S) as:
P (M˜(D) ∈ S) =
∑
d
P (M(d) ∈ S)× P (d|D)
=
∑
d1d2...dn
P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d1d2 . . . dn|D)
=
∑
d1
∑
d2...dn
P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d1|D1)× P (d2 . . . dn|D2 . . . Dn)
=
∑
d2...dn
[
∑
d1
P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d1|D1)]× P (d2 . . . dn|D2 . . . Dn)
Now we bound
∑
d1
P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)×P (d1|D1), and then finish the proof. For any d1 and d′1, we
know that P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S) ≤ eε × P (M(d′1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S) + δ. Thus, for a fixed d1 and arbitrary d′1,
∑
d1
P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d1|D1)
≤
∑
d1
(eε × P (M(d′1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S) + δ)× P (d1|D1)
= eε × P (M(d′1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S) + δ
Multiply both sides by P (d′1|D′1), and then sum over all d′1,∑
d1
P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d1|D1) ≤ eε × (
∑
d′1
P (M(d′1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d′1|D′1)) + δ
Now we finish the proof using the inequality above,
P (M˜(D) ∈ S) =
∑
d2...dn
[
∑
d1
P (M(d1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d1|D1)]× P (d2 . . . dn|D2 . . . Dn)
≤
∑
d2...dn
(eε × (
∑
d′1
P (M(d′1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d′1|D′1)) + δ)× P (d2 . . . dn|D2 . . . Dn)
≤ eε
∑
d2...dn
∑
d′1
P (M(d′1d2 . . . dn) ∈ S)× P (d′1|D′1)× P (d2 . . . dn|D2 . . . Dn) + δ
= eε × P (M˜(D′) ∈ S) + δ
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B Proof for Corollaries
B.1 Proof for Corollary 1
Proof. First get θ by standard calculation: θ = max{10, deW (C)+1 − 12e}, where W is the Lambert W
function [14] and C = (ln 8
7
√
2piδ
)/e. Then solve L ln(1 + 1√n
γθ −1
) ≤ ε, we get γ ≤ e
ε
L−1
θe
ε
L
√
n. Theorem 1
requires γ ≤
√
n
θ+1 , this is satisfied by ε ≤ L ln(θ + 1).
When n ≥ 104, choose θ = dlog10 n + 6e. When n = 104, θ = 10, and if n is greater than 104, it is easy
to see that θ! increase faster than n. Formally, when n increase by 10 times, θ increase by 1, and θ! increase
by more than 10 times. Thus, for n ≥ 104,
θ! ≥ n
104
∗ 10! = n
104
∗ 3.6 ∗ 106 = 360n
Also when θ ≥ 10, θ−2θ−3 ≤ 87 , then,
θ − 2
(θ − 3)θ! ≤
1
300n
C Additional Discussions
C.1 Multiple Sequences per User
The following algorithm shows the details of how Algorithm 1 can be extended to the setting where each
user has multiple words.
Algorithm 3 A Trie-based Frequent Sequence Algorithm M(D, θ, γ) for Multiple Sequences per User.
Input: A set D = {u1, u2, . . . , un}, A threshold θ. Batch size m = γ
√
n.
Output: A trie.
Set T = {root}; Told = None; i = 1;
while T ! = Told do
Choose m users from D uniformly at random, denote as X˜ . Initialize X˜ = {}.
for For each user ui ∈ X˜ do
Randomly select a sequence wj ∈ ui with respect to its frequency fi(wj) in ui, and add wj to X˜ .
end for
Told = T ;
T = V(X˜ , T, θ, i); i++;
end while
return T ;
C.2 Time, Space and Communication Complexity Analysis of TrieHH
Time Complexity Running time on the server side is O(m) for each round, so the total running time is
O(mL). For the running time on the user side, suppose each user has at most Z words, then searching for a
certain prefix cost O(ZlogZ). Because there are at most mθ node in each level, searching for all the prefixes
in this round cost at most O( 1θmZlogZ). Thus the total running time for each user is O(
mZL
θ logZ).
Space Complexity Space complexity on both the server and user side is the size of the trie. Because
there are at most mθ node in each level, and there are at most L levels except the root node, total space
complexity is O(Lmθ ).
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Communication Cost The worst case communication cost for round i: m
2
θ × C × i, where C is the cost
to communicate a node in the trie. This is because there are at most mθ length i paths in the trie at round
i, and the server need to update the current trie with m users. The algorithm runs for at most L rounds,
thus the total communication cost is at most
∑
i
m2
θ × C × i = m
2L(L+1)C
2θ .
C.3 Heavy Hitters Lists
We provide the list of the top 200 heavy hitters in the Sentiment140 dataset, and in the OOV dataset after
we filter out the words in the dictionary.
Top 100 heavy hitters with frequencies in the Sentiment140 dataset
{ ’ the ’ : ’ 0 . 1 028 ’ , ’ you ’ : ’ 0 . 0360 ’ , ’ and ’ : ’ 0 . 0308 ’ , ’ ju s t ’ : ’ 0 . 0209 ’ , ” i ’m” :
’ 0 . 0169 ’ , ’ f o r ’ : ’ 0 . 0 143 ’ , ’ have ’ : ’ 0 . 0107 ’ , ’ going ’ : ’ 0 . 0 086 ’ , ’ not ’ :
’ 0 . 0074 ’ , ’ that ’ : ’ 0 . 0 073 ’ , ’ was ’ : ’ 0 . 0 069 ’ , ’ good ’ : ’ 0 . 0062 ’ , ’ work ’ :
’ 0 . 0056 ’ , ” i t ’ s ” : ’ 0 . 0055 ’ , ’ th i s ’ : ’ 0 . 0 053 ’ , ’ watching ’ : ’ 0 . 0 052 ’ , ’ back
’ : ’ 0 . 0051 ’ , ’ got ’ : ’ 0 . 0 049 ’ , ’ with ’ : ’ 0 . 0 048 ’ , ’ had ’ : ’ 0 . 0048 ’ , ’ love ’ :
’ 0 . 0047 ’ , ’ r e a l l y ’ : ’ 0 . 0047 ’ , ”can ’ t ” : ’ 0 . 0046 ’ , ’ has ’ : ’ 0 . 0045 ’ , ’ but ’ :
’ 0 . 0043 ’ , ’ miss ’ : ’ 0 . 0 039 ’ , ’ s t i l l ’ : ’ 0 . 0 039 ’ , ’ i t s ’ : ’ 0 . 0037 ’ , ’ want ’ :
’ 0 . 0036 ’ , ’ g e t t ing ’ : ’ 0 . 0035 ’ , ’ day ’ : ’ 0 . 0035 ’ , ”don ’ t ” : ’ 0 . 0033 ’ , ’ happy
’ : ’ 0 . 0033 ’ , ’ what ’ : ’ 0 . 0032 ’ , ’now ’ : ’ 0 . 0032 ’ , ’why ’ : ’ 0 . 0031 ’ , ’ l o l ’ :
’ 0 . 0031 ’ , ’home ’ : ’ 0 . 0031 ’ , ’ wish ’ : ’ 0 . 0030 ’ , ’ today ’ : ’ 0 . 0030 ’ , ’ a l l ’ :
’ 0 . 0029 ’ , ’new ’ : ’ 0 . 0029 ’ , ’ o f f ’ : ’ 0 . 0 028 ’ , ’ need ’ : ’ 0 . 0028 ’ , ’ your ’ :
’ 0 . 0028 ’ , ’ hate ’ : ’ 0 . 0 026 ’ , ’ sad ’ : ’ 0 . 0 026 ’ , ’ l a s t ’ : ’ 0 . 0 026 ’ , ’ think ’ :
’ 0 . 0025 ’ , ’ t ry ing ’ : ’ 0 . 0025 ’ , ’ out ’ : ’ 0 . 0025 ’ , ’ get ’ : ’ 0 . 0025 ’ , ’ hey ’ :
’ 0 . 0024 ’ , ’ working ’ : ’ 0 . 0 023 ’ , ’ l i k e ’ : ’ 0 . 0 023 ’ , ’ f i n a l l y ’ : ’ 0 . 0 022 ’ , ’ too
’ : ’ 0 . 0022 ’ , ’ wel l ’ : ’ 0 . 0 022 ’ , ’ about ’ : ’ 0 . 0 022 ’ , ’ one ’ : ’ 0 . 0 021 ’ , ’ w i l l ’ :
’ 0 . 0021 ’ , ’ thanks ’ : ’ 0 . 0 021 ’ , ’ very ’ : ’ 0 . 0021 ’ , ’ are ’ : ’ 0 . 0 021 ’ , ’ f e e l ’ :
’ 0 . 0020 ’ , ’ cant ’ : ’ 0 . 0 020 ’ , ’ time ’ : ’ 0 . 0020 ’ , ’ bored ’ : ’ 0 . 0020 ’ , ’ f e e l i n g
’ : ’ 0 . 0019 ’ , ’omg ’ : ’ 0 . 0019 ’ , ’ having ’ : ’ 0 . 0018 ’ , ’ t i r ed ’ : ’ 0 . 0018 ’ , ’ her
’ : ’ 0 . 0018 ’ , ’ ugh ’ : ’ 0 . 0018 ’ , ’ more ’ : ’ 0 . 0 017 ’ , ’ wait ing ’ : ’ 0 . 0 017 ’ , ’
miss ing ’ : ’ 0 . 0016 ’ , ’ s i t t i n g ’ : ’ 0 . 0 016 ’ , ’ tw i t t e r ’ : ’ 0 . 0016 ’ , ’ haha ’ :
’ 0 . 0016 ’ , ’ l i s t e n i n g ’ : ’ 0 . 0 016 ’ , ’how ’ : ’ 0 . 0016 ’ , ’ wants ’ : ’ 0 . 0 016 ’ , ’
great ’ : ’ 0 . 0015 ’ , ’wow ’ : ’ 0 . 0015 ’ , ’ s i ck ’ : ’ 0 . 0 014 ’ , ’ they ’ : ’ 0 . 0 014 ’ , ’
know ’ : ’ 0 . 0014 ’ , ’ can ’ : ’ 0 . 0014 ’ , ’ night ’ : ’ 0 . 0 014 ’ , ’ another ’ : ’ 0 . 0014 ’ ,
’ morning ’ : ’ 0 . 0 014 ’ , ’damn ’ : ’ 0 . 0014 ’ , ’ @mileycyrus ’ : ’ 0 . 0014 ’ , ’way ’ :
’ 0 . 0014 ’ , ’ yay ’ : ’ 0 . 0014 ’ , ’ dont ’ : ’ 0 . 0 014 ’ , ’ look ing ’ : ’ 0 . 0013 ’ , ’ some ’ :
’ 0 . 0013 ’ , ’ she ’ : ’ 0 . 0013 ’}
Top 100 heavy hitters with frequencies in the OOV dataset generated from Sentiment140
{ ’ dont ’ : ’ 0 . 011741 ’ , ’ thats ’ : ’ 0 . 006008 ’ , ’ didnt ’ : ’ 0 . 004292 ’ , ’ sooo ’ :
’ 0 . 004023 ’ , ’awww’ : ’ 0 . 003468 ’ , ’ @mileycyrus ’ : ’ 0 . 002931 ’ , ’ @tommcfly ’ :
’ 0 . 002556 ’ , ’ soooo ’ : ’ 0 . 002473 ’ , ’ @ddlovato ’ : ’ 0 . 002254 ’ , ’ doesnt ’ :
’ 0 . 001800 ’ , ’# f o l l o w f r i d a y ’ : ’ 0 . 001694 ’ , ’ havent ’ : ’ 0 . 001559 ’ , ’
@jonasbrothers ’ : ’ 0 . 001553 ’ , ’ i sn t ’ : ’ 0 . 001336 ’ , ’#fb ’ : ’ 0 . 001168 ’ , ’
sooooo ’ : ’ 0 . 001041 ’ , ’awwww’ : ’ 0 . 001037 ’ , ’ tweetdeck ’ : ’ 0 . 000958 ’ , ’
couldnt ’ : ’ 0 . 000939 ’ , ” : ’ ( ” : ’ 0 . 000931 ’ , ’ wasnt ’ : ’ 0 . 000913 ’ , ’ ( via ’ :
’ 0 . 000896 ’ , ’ @davidarchie ’ : ’ 0 . 000892 ’ , ’ @donniewahlberg ’ : ’ 0 . 000865 ’ , ’
@jonathanrknight ’ : ’ 0 . 000825 ’ , ’∗ s i gh ∗ ’ : ’ 0 . 000811 ’ , ’ @jordanknight ’ :
’ 0 . 000749 ’ , ’ oooh ’ : ’ 0 . 000730 ’ , ’ @mitchelmusso ’ : ’ 0 . 000708 ’ , ’ ( and ’ :
’ 0 . 000705 ’ , ’ ohhh ’ : ’ 0 . 000693 ’ , ’ ahhhh ’ : ’ 0 . 000664 ’ , ’∗ hugs ∗ ’ : ’ 0 . 000647 ’ ,
’ nooo ’ : ’ 0 . 000634 ’ , ’# f f ’ : ’ 0 . 000628 ’ , ’#squarespace ’ : ’ 0 . 000612 ’ , ’ youre
’ : ’ 0 . 000609 ’ , ’ p . s ’ : ’ 0 . 000594 ’ , ’ noooo ’ : ’ 0 . 000588 ’ , ’ b/c ’ : ’ 0 . 000581 ’ ,
’ ughh ’ : ’ 0 . 000575 ’ , ’ goodmorning ’ : ’ 0 . 000555 ’ , ’mmmm’ : ’ 0 . 000553 ’ , ’ r e : ’ :
’ 0 . 000552 ’ , ’ tw i tp i c ’ : ’ 0 . 000540 ’ , ’ soooooo ’ : ’ 0 . 000529 ’ , ’ @dougiemcfly ’ :
’ 0 . 000525 ’ , ’ @selenagomez ’ : ’ 0 . 000524 ’ , ’ bgt ’ : ’ 0 . 000514 ’ , ’ r e a l i s e d ’ :
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’ 0 . 000508 ’ , ” ’em” : ’ 0 . 000503 ’ , ’ thankyou ’ : ’ 0 . 000487 ’ , ”ya ’ l l ” :
’ 0 . 000477 ’ , ’ xxxx ’ : ’ 0 . 000471 ’ , ’ booo ’ : ’ 0 . 000464 ’ , ’ youu ’ : ’ 0 . 000458 ’ , ’
@dannymcfly ’ : ’ 0 . 000455 ’ , ’ wouldnt ’ : ’ 0 . 000447 ’ , ’ a t l e a s t ’ : ’ 0 . 000434 ’ , ’
heyy ’ : ’ 0 . 000432 ’ , ” ’ cause ” : ’ 0 . 000432 ’ , ’ ughhh ’ : ’ 0 . 000430 ’ , ’ photo : ’ :
’ 0 . 000427 ’ , ’ r . i . p ’ : ’ 0 . 000421 ’ , ’wooo ’ : ’ 0 . 000415 ’ , ’ @ p e t e r f a c i n e l l i ’ :
’ 0 . 000415 ’ , ’ @aplusk ’ : ’ 0 . 000409 ’ , ’ tooo ’ : ’ 0 . 000408 ’ , ’ tommorow ’ :
’ 0 . 000405 ’ , ’ hayfever ’ : ’ 0 . 000405 ’ , ’ a .m’ : ’ 0 . 000401 ’ , ’ @joeymcintyre ’ :
’ 0 . 000399 ’ , ’ goood ’ : ’ 0 . 000389 ’ , ’ urgh ’ : ’ 0 . 000376 ’ , ’@youngq ’ :
’ 0 . 000369 ’ , ’w/o ’ : ’ 0 . 000368 ’ , ’ awsome ’ : ’ 0 . 000360 ’ , ’ ( or ’ : ’ 0 . 000355 ’ , ’
a swe l l ’ : ’ 0 . 000354 ’ , ’ skoo l ’ : ’ 0 . 000354 ’ , ’ tweet i e ’ : ’ 0 . 000353 ’ , ’ tomorow
’ : ’ 0 . 000346 ’ , ’ boooo ’ : ’ 0 . 000336 ’ , ’ @shaundiviney ’ : ’ 0 . 000335 ’ , ’#
i r a n e l e c t i o n ’ : ’ 0 . 000335 ’ , ’:−d ’ : ’ 0 . 000330 ’ , ’awwwww’ : ’ 0 . 000330 ’ , ’#seb−
day ’ : ’ 0 . 000329 ’ , ’ nooooo ’ : ’ 0 . 000327 ’ , ’ yeahh ’ : ’ 0 . 000326 ’ , ’ @perezhi l ton
’ : ’ 0 . 000322 ’ , ’ @tomfelton ’ : ’ 0 . 000316 ’ , ”g ’ n ight ” : ’ 0 . 000313 ’ , ’
t w i t t e r v e r s e ’ : ’ 0 . 000311 ’ , ’ ( y ) ’ : ’ 0 . 000304 ’ , ’ g r r r r ’ : ’ 0 . 000299 ’ , ’
@ o f f i c i a l t i l a ’ : ’ 0 . 000296 ’ , ’ r e a l i s e ’ : ’ 0 . 000289 ’ , ’ ( not ’ : ’ 0 . 000286 ’ , ’
@ k i r s t i e a l l e y ’ : ’ 0 . 000285 ’}
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